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I. INTRODUCTION
The American mass incarceration crisis and the collateral consequences 
that flow from it are long standing and well documented,1 but the United States 
has only lately begun grappling with its international leadership in political penal 
punitiveness.  Going to back to William Stuntz’s groundbreaking discussion of 
the Pathological Politics of Criminal Law in the United States,2 both the 
scholarly literature and the popular dialogue surrounding mass incarceration 
have largely focused on the role of legislatures or the police in driving the 
incarceration crisis, ignoring the role that prosecutorial politics and power have 
played in it or alluding to it only in passing.3  It is for this reason that Maximo 
Langer and David Alan Sklansky’s edited volume, Prosecutors and 
Democracy,4 which contains comparative perspectives about the respective roles 
that prosecutors and democracy have in shaping one another, is so timely. 
I have previously written about the conflicts of interest that conviction-
based performance measures in American prosecutors’ offices create, by 
incentivizing prosecutorial overcharging, a leading—but often unexplored—
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1 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); John Pfaff, The Durability of Prison Populations, 2010 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 73. 
2 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 
(2001). 
3 See John Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth 28 GA. ST. L. REV. 1239, 
1242 (2012) (explaining that studies of mass incarceration tend to focus on the role of macro 
developments and complex social phenomena at the state and national level while ignoring “the 
fact that it appears county prosecutors bear the largest responsibility.”); Juleyka Lantigua-
Williams, Are Prosecutors the Key to Justice Reform?, THE ATLANTIC (May 18, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/are-prosecutors-the-key-to-justice-
reform/483252/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2018) (explaining that, until recently, mass incarceration 
was blamed on macro-level explanations like socio-economic factors or sentencing guidelines 
while ignoring the role of growing prosecutorial power); see, e.g., JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING 
UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017); Brett Dignam, Learning to 
Counter Mass Incarceration, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1217 (2016); Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal 
Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381 (2018); Jonathan Simon, Consuming Obsessions: Housing, Homicide, 
and Mass Incarceration Since 1950, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 165; Jonathan Simon, The New 
Overcrowding, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1191 (2016). 
4   PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY (MAXIMO LANGER & 
DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, eds. 2017) [hereinafter “PROSECUTORS & DEMOCRACY”]. 
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contributor to mass incarceration in the United States.5  Recent media coverage 
of the so-far stalled attempts at national criminal-justice reform have hinted at 
the role that prosecutors have played in the dysfunctional politics of crime in the 
United States.6  That is why it is so exciting to see a comparative scholarly 
perspective on prosecutorial accountability at this moment in time. 
While dedicated to the role of prosecutors in international contexts more 
broadly, much of the sprawling collection of book chapters sheds light on both 
the role of prosecutors in driving dysfunctional penal policies and their 
insulation from accountability for that role in the United States.  While the 
collection is framed as a comparative study and appears, on its surface, to be a 
descriptive comparison of various prosecutorial models of accountability, taken 
together, many of the chapters read more like a collective critique of the 
dysfunctional politics of American prosecution.  As David Sklansky notes in his 
final chapter of the collection: “Europe relies on hierarchical oversight to guide 
prosecutors and to keep them in check.  Americans prize local democratic 
control, so we [attempt to] do with elections what Europeans do with multi-tiered 
bureaucracy.” (Pp. 278–79.) He describes the resulting contrasting views on the 
role of prosecutors in the United States and Europe, with the traditional 
American prosecutorial archetype being an adversary, working closely with the 
police, and exercising a great deal discretion and the traditional European 
prosecutorial archetype being an inquisitor or adjudicator, and officer of the 
court, and an agent of the law. (P. 287.) 
II. INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS
A. International Perspectives
In her chapter, entitled “The Democratic Accountability of Prosecutors in
England and Wales and France,” Jacqueline Hodgson describes and contrasts 
the different accountability measures governing prosecutors in England and 
Wales and France, respectively.  She notes that, in France, le procureur (the 
public prosecutor) is not elected and has a hybrid role, as a judicial officer who 
implements government policy. (Pp. 85, 98.) Hodgson identifies a threat to 
prosecution and democracy in France from the executive branch and, in 
particular, political meddling via executive control over prosecution, which 
historically extended to instructions in individual cases. (P. 101.)  She notes that, 
historically, instructions in individual cases enabled governments to protect 
favored individuals from scrutiny, by steering cases away from the juge 
d’instruction and under the authority of the procureur, undermining the 
independence of the procureur. (P. 101.) 
In her description of prosecutors in England and Wales, Hodgson notes that 
the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”), like the French procurer, is also an 
unelected official, but, unlike the procureur, does not sit within a political or 
5   See Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes III: Personnel Policies and 
Conflicts of Interest in Prosecutors’ Offices, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53 (2012); see 
generally Pfaff, supra note 3. 
6   See Lantigua-Williams, supra note 3. 
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judicial hierarchy. (P. 98.) Therefore, crown prosecutors in England and Wales 
are not under the direct authority of the Minister of Justice. (P. 102.) Instead, the 
DPP is appointed by and responsible to the Attorney General, whose office 
advises the government and represents the public interest, which is 
conventionally defined narrowly so as to exclude the political interests of the 
government. (P. 87.) Hodgson notes that this creates a less direct line of political 
accountability, which gives prosecutors in England and Wales a high degree of 
professional autonomy. (Pp. 87, 98.) Instead, the accountability of Crown 
Prosecutors comes from the range of legal guidance and “plethora of policy 
guidance” that they must follow with regard to charging decisions and the 
public’s participation in the development of DPP policies. (Pp. 89, 105.) 
In her chapter, entitled “The French Prosecutor as Judge,” Mathilde Cohen 
picks up the theme of the hybrid nature of French prosecutors as members of the 
judiciary who nonetheless report to the executive branch. (Pp. 115.) She notes 
that, like their American counterparts, French prosecutors have no real 
obligation to justify their exercises of prosecutorial discretion.7  She also notes 
that, possibly unlike some of their American counterparts, French prosecutors 
identify themselves as “impartial accusers” and “‘advocates of the law’ who 
disinterestedly apply criminal statutes for the ‘public good,’” (P. 111.) who 
“insist that they are not a typical party to the criminal trial . . . .” (P. 128.) 
Like Hodgson, Cohen notes the historical entitlement of the Minister of 
Justice to define national penal policies and to give written instructions in 
individual cases, including the de jure power to order the prosecution of a given 
person and the de facto power to discontinue the prosecution of a political ally. 
(Pp. 117–18)  Nonetheless, Cohen argues that, in practice, French prosecutors 
have developed several approaches to counteracting hierarchical and political 
pressures, including by way of decentralization, unionization, and their 
identification with the judiciary.  She claims that the structural and professional 
bonds between judges and prosecutors, along with their overlapping areas of 
competence, operate as checks on their discretion and a powerful motivation for 
prosecutors to be independent decision makers. (Pp. 130–31.) As a result, 
prosecutors’ unions have been active in pushing for greater prosecutorial 
independence, at both the individual and collective level, including demands for 
insulating the transfer and promotion systems from political interference by the 
executive branch. (Pp. 135–36.) They also have more discretion in how they 
prosecute crimes, which includes a more diverse range of penal responses, 
including the growing use of alternative dispute resolutions. (P. 134.) 
In her chapter, entitled “German Prosecutors and the Rechtsstaat,” Shawn 
Boyne explores the structure and role of the German prosecutorial service and 
mines them for broader lessons about the relationship between prosecutorial 
independence and democratic accountability.  She notes that “in contrast to the 
current robust criticism concerning prosecutorial overreaching in the U.S., the 
7  See id. at 120.  French prosecutors are under a legal duty to explain their decisions to their 
supervisors in only three circumstances, when they: decline to prosecute or terminate prosecution; 
seek or extend a suspect’s pretrial detention; and propose charges in the “most serious” cases.  Id. 
In the first two situations (declination and pretrial detention), their reasons are “purely boilerplate,” 
in that they “check boxes on fill-out forms.”  Id. at 120–21. 
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German prosecution service is not under fire for over-prosecuting cases.” (P. 
140.) According to Boyne, “German prosecutors do not measure their success in 
convictions and long sentences.” (P. 167.) Instead, as unelected bureaucrats with 
life tenure and a statutory mandate to be beholden only to the law, whose offices 
are independent of both the police and the judiciary, German prosecutors are 
apolitical and function relatively free from political influence. (Pp. 141–42.) As 
a result: “Unlike American prosecutors, who may define their individual success 
. . . in terms of ‘winning’ trials and ‘putting the defendant away,’” most German 
prosecutors “are not invested in ‘winning’ a case.” (P. 145.) 
Boyne notes that the die Generalstaatsanwalte (the General Public 
Prosecutors, who are the top regional prosecutors throughout Germany) are 
directly accountable to the Ministry of Justice and bound to follow the orders of 
their superiors, and the Minister is politically accountable to Parliament. (Pp. 
141–42, 149, 151, 157.) She concedes that the ministry’s control function could 
constitute “questionable political interference,” but notes that, unlike in France, 
prosecutors’ superiors cannot generally order them to handle individual cases in 
specific manners, but rather can only issue general instructions that apply to 
categories of routine types of cases. (Pp. 141–42, 149, 151, 157, 159.) In fact, in 
Germany, these instructions are not even mandatory, but rather “an informal 
suggestion.” (P. 159.) Because of these structural guarantees of independence, 
Boyne claims that most members of the German prosecution service “are 
fiercely independent and seek to serve the law, rather than politics.” (P. 143.) 
She credits organizational culture, and in particular “informal collegial 
controls,” (P. 154.) with nurturing prosecutors’ relative independence in 
Germany, along with their commitment to Rechsstaat, the requirement that the 
State act in a lawful way. (Pp. 145–46, 154.) She describes German prosecutors 
as “protected civil servants who are embedded in a collegial culture that fosters 
a norm of non-partisanship and impartiality.” (P. 159.) That culture dictates that 
German prosecutors be guardians of the law and pillars of the Rechsstaat. (P. 
146.) She also credits Parliamentary oversight with being a check against cases 
of partisan interference in prosecutorial decision making. (P. 159.) 
While descriptive on the surface, taken together, Hodgson’s, Cohen’s, and 
Boyne’s chapters strongly suggest that removing prosecutors from the 
instructional hierarchy of elected politicians, or at least limiting the nature and 
scope of their interference with the exercises of prosecutorial discretion, is the 
best way to breed a culture of prosecutorial professionalism. 
B. Domestic Perspectives
The book opens theoretically with Antony Duff’s chapter, entitled
“Discretion and Accountability in a Democratic Criminal Law,” in which he 
explores the concern that arises from unaccountable prosecutorial discretion and 
the appropriate role of prosecutors in a democracy and, in the process, takes aim 
at prosecutorial overcharging. (Pp. 9–32.) Duff asserts that equal concern and 
respect for all members of the polity are democratic requirements. (P. 13.) He 
argues that the enactment of overbroad criminal offenses gives prosecutors “a 
dangerous power to coerce citizens” whose conduct minimally satisfies the 
definition of the offense. (P. 23.) He deduces, therefore, that, in addition to 
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applying an evidential test, prosecutors should also apply a public interest test in 
deciding whether to prosecute individual offenders and that this test should 
include consideration of proportionality and the seriousness of the defendant’s 
actual conduct in relation to the conduct at which the penal statute is aimed and 
the costs of prosecution and punishment on the defendant. (Pp. 20–26, 29–30.) 
He notes: “No one can seriously hold that we must prosecute and punish all those 
who commit public wrongs, whatever the cost . . . .” (Pp. 25.) In this sense, the 
consideration of proportionality that he advocates is one that asks “not only 
whether a kind of conduct constitutes a public wrong that [legislators] therefore 
have reason to criminalise, but whether it is a wrong of such a kind that that 
reason is a good enough reason.” (P. 25.) Duff also discusses the concept of 
mercy, “as something distinct from justice,” which is an additional reason for 
prosecutors not to prosecute certain cases. (P. 26.) 
Similarly, in his chapter, entitled “Accounting for Prosecutors,” Dan 
Richman identifies several ways that legal actors can address both overcharging 
and the collateral consequences of criminal convictions by exploring the power 
that prosecutorial discretion gives American prosecutors to effectively define the 
criminal law more narrowly than the outer limits of penal statutes. (Pp. 45, 73.) 
He notes that this power also gives prosecutors the ability to force police officers 
to account for their actions. (P. 53.) He also describes the “soft power” that 
judges have to admonish prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining, even 
though the separation of powers generally prohibits formal review of these 
decisions. (P. 67.) He concludes that the system would benefit from the 
promotion of a “shared language of justification” for discretionary decisions in 
the criminal-justice system. (P. 70.) 
Later, the edited collection moves in a more applied direction. In his 
chapter, entitled “The Organization of Prosecutorial Discretion,” William Simon 
traces the salient elements of prosecutorial discretion in the United States, 
comparing the regulation of prosecutors’ decision making with the regulation of 
professional decision making in other fields.  He notes a trend in American 
prosecution away from “informal standards associated with professionalism” 
toward more specific, presumptive rules. (Pp. 184.) He also documents the rarity 
of peer review in American prosecution, noting the possibility (but absence) of 
intensive qualitative discussions of individual cases akin to mortality/morbidity 
reviews of adverse events in medicine. (P. 187.) Simon discusses performance 
measurement, contrasting good performance metrics, which are linked to 
ongoing assessments of relevant practices and produce systemic information that 
can guide reform, with poor performance metrics, which are incomplete and 
focus on rewards and sanctions, using the “teaching to the test” phenomenon in 
education as an example. (P. 189.) Finally, Simon links his observations about 
prosecutorial discretion to the concept of democracy, proposing an alternative 
conception of accountability embedded in the notion of stakeholder democracy 
in lieu of a narrower conception of democracy that emphasizes only electoral 
politics. (P. 193.) 
In her chapter, entitled “Prosecutors, Democracy, and Race,” Angela 
Davis’s critique of the American system of prosecutorial elections is more 
explicit, although her piece challenges Americans to make lemonade out of this 
lemon, by calling on them to use their electoral system better to address 
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persistence racial bias in the criminal-justice system. (P. 195.) Davis begins by 
noting two things that are relevant to her normative thesis: first, that racial 
disparities are more often the result of unconscious biases than intentional 
discrimination (P. 205.); and, second, that prosecutors make the most important 
decisions in the criminal process in the exercise of their charging and plea 
bargaining (and, therefore, sentencing) discretion and that they do so with “very 
little accountability to the people they serve.” (P. 195.) Taken together, the result 
of these two observations is that prosecutors’ implicit racial biases result in racial 
disparities in their charging and plea-bargaining decisions. (P. 205.) Therefore, 
due to the dominant role that prosecutors play in the criminal process, the biases 
in their decisions often produce and perpetuate systemic failures like 
unwarranted racial disparities, mass incarceration, and police killings of 
unarmed people of color. (Pp. 195, 202.) 
Nonetheless, Davis’s chapter is rather hopeful.  She argues that, despite the 
widespread use of prosecutorial elections at the state and local levels in the 
United States, the electoral system has not proven to be an effective mechanism 
of accountability for prosecutors, especially when it comes to racial disparities, 
due to the lack of transparency in prosecutorial elections, the frequency of 
incumbents running without opposition, and the popularity of “tough on crime” 
platforms. (Pp. 195, 207–209.) She claims that the electoral system, despite its 
flaws, provides an effective opportunity to hold prosecutors accountable and 
tackle the racial disparities in the American criminal-justice system through the 
election of prosecutors who are committed to racial justice. (Pp. 224–25.) She 
also claims that the response to prosecutors’ failure to bring charges arising out 
of a number of recent, high-profile police killings of unarmed black men—like 
the killing of Eric Garner by Staten Island police officers and the killing of 
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri—has sparked widespread protests, 
invigorated the Black Lives Matter social-justice movement, and may change 
the lack of attention that the electorate ordinarily pays to prosecutorial elections 
and the important role that prosecutors play in determining whether people of 
color are treated fairly in the criminal-justice system. (Pp. 210–13.) 
Davis contrasts the case studies of Robert McCulloch’s poor handling of 
the Brown case in Ferguson and Marilyn Mosby’s better handling of the Freddie 
Gray case in Baltimore, Maryland with John Chisholm, the District Attorney in 
Milwaukie, Wisconsin’s long-term commitment to racial justice to demonstrate 
that a prosecutor’s handling of a single high-profile case will not have an impact 
on racial disparities in the criminal-justice system.8  Based on the lessons drawn 
from these case studies, Davis concludes that the democratic election of 
prosecutors can only serve to eliminate racial disparities with more transparency 
in the prosecution function and the election of prosecutors who are committed 
to racial justice and that a prosecutor’s commitment to racial justice can only be 
8  See id. at 210–24.  McCulloch has been widely criticized for his anemic and inadequate 
legal instructions to the grand jury investigating the Brown shooting and his denigration of victims 
of other police shootings in the media.  See id. at 215.  Chisholm, on the other hand, agreed to 
participate in the Vera’s Institute’s Prosecution and Racial Justice Program, which involved the 
collection and analysis of data to determine the impact of prosecutors’ discretionary decisions on 
criminal-justice disparities.  See id. at 223. 
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demonstrated by a pledge to take affirmative steps to remedy disparities. (Pp. 
196, 210, 222.) 
In her chapter, entitled “Prosecuting Immigrants in a Democracy,” Ingrid 
Eagly also explicitly critiques American prosecutors who rely on the tools of the 
immigration system to buttress the criminal prosecutions of non-citizen 
defendants. (P. 236.) She begins by describing the expansive control that 
American prosecutors have over not only criminal cases, but also immigration 
outcomes for non-citizen defendants. (P. 239.) She notes the power of 
prosecutors to trigger the deportation of noncitizens through the pursuit and 
negotiation of pretextual criminal charges and the exclusion of noncitizens from 
alternatives to imprisonment, in a system in which deportation is increasingly a 
prosecutorial goal rather than a collateral consequence of conviction, even when 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain the underlying criminal charges. (Pp. 233–
34, 237–38.) She also describes the parallel system of federal prisons for non-
citizen inmates, which are run exclusively by for-profit corporations and are 
designed with particularly high percentages of extreme isolation cells. (P. 238.) 
These descriptions underlie Eagly’s normative questions about how the 
criminal law in a democratic society ought to treat noncitizens. (P. 228.) She 
argues that the blurring of immigration and criminal enforcement through the 
exposure of immigrants to enhanced criminal punishments and the use of 
prosecutorial immigration powers to bypass the normal protections of criminal 
procedure have distorted the prosecutorial function and core procedural 
safeguards, fostered unequal treatment based on citizenship status, and resulted 
in systematically greater punishments for immigrants compared to citizens. (Pp. 
233–37.) She advocates three specific reforms: (1) written prosecutorial policies 
to ensure the consistent consideration of immigration consequences during plea 
bargaining and encourage the practice of allowing non-citizens to plead around 
immigration consequences; (2) judicial oversight of deportation consequences 
by criminal sentencing judges; and (3) increased public-defender resources to 
enable the provision of effective and comprehensive legal representation for 
non-citizens clients. (Pp. 240–47.) She concludes by urging the decoupling of 
criminal prosecution from punitive reliance on the immigration system and the 
rejection of formal rules of citizenship as the mechanism for delineating the 
scope of substantive law and procedural protections in the criminal-justice 
system. (P. 249.) 
Perhaps no chapter in the edited collection calls more clearly for reform of 
American prosecutorial politics than Jonathan Simon’s chapter, entitled 
“Beyond Tough on Crime: Towards a Better Politics of Prosecution,” in which 
Simon picks up on many of the themes in Davis’s chapter with regard to the 
challenges facing policing, courts, and correctional institutions in light of the 
severity of the American carceral state, including mass incarceration, punitive 
policing, and the resulting crisis in legitimacy that has emerged in the past two 
decades. (Pp. 251, 253, 258.)  Simon argues that the relative invisibility of 
prosecutorial operations, in which the public aware only of the local prosecutor’s 
“conviction rate,” has fostered the maintenance of racial hierarchies and close 
alignment with the police while nonetheless enabling prosecutors’ absence from 
the visible leadership on criminal-justice reform. (Pp. 250, 254, 256–57, 261, 
271.) He explains how the politics of prosecution include influencing how 
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citizens in the carceral state imagine crime and the penal system, based on a 
presumption of dangerousness, prosecutors’ “experiential knowledge of the 
criminal class,” (P. 260.) and promoting a specific set of normative expectations 
about what political institutions can do to foster public safety by maximizing 
imprisonment and over-punishing people of color who do not pose a significant 
risk to public safety, while simultaneously espousing a color-blind vision of 
equality. (Pp. 254, 257–58, 260, 271.) 
Simon then explores two alternative types of politics of prosecution and 
evaluates them normatively.  First, he describes the new “smart on crime” 
politics of many putative reform prosecutors. (P. 264.) He argues that, while a 
few individual elected prosecutors and former Attorneys General have become 
identified with the cause of criminal-justice reform, and while self-described 
reform prosecutors have won elections, most have not been willing to go so far 
as to confront the true legitimacy crisis of mass incarceration. (Pp. 251, 253.) He 
describes the prosecutorial politics of “smart on crime” as being based primarily 
on “the language of dollars and results” (P. 271)—i.e., ideas about budget 
deficits, economic efficiency, empiricism (evidence-based practices, with a 
focus on recidivism), and managerial effectiveness, such as maximizing public 
“return on investment.” (Pp. 259–61, 271.) He argues that proper scale of the 
carceral state is primarily a normative and political judgment, not an empirical 
one. (P. 261–62.)  He also argues that recidivism rates are themselves 
fundamentally normative, based largely on subjective decisions like whether and 
when to “violate” and reincarcerate probationers and parolees for mere technical 
violations of their conditions of release. (P. 262.) He critiques the politics of 
“smart on crime” as an insignificant break with the politics of “tough on crime” 
because “smart on crime” prosecutors stop short of applying their calls for 
reducing incarceration and enhancing reentry programs to long prison sentences 
for serious, violent crimes, the greatest driver of the human and financial costs 
of the carceral state. (P. 260–65.) He also critiques the “smart on crime” 
prosecution movement for failing to engage meaningfully with its public 
audience, change its normative commitments to the public-safety model, shift 
its primary emphasis away from its espoused ability to pick out the dangerous 
class of criminals, sever its close alliance with the racially discriminatory police 
machinery, or address its own “culture of misconduct.” (Pp. 262–63, 265.) 
By way of contrast, Simon describes a second emerging model of 
prosecutorial reform, based on “the language of dignity and empathy,” (P. 271.) 
which he calls the “politics of dignity” (P. 266) and describes as a more radical 
departure from the politics of “tough on crime.” (P. 265–266, 271.) This model 
includes efforts to force institutional changes by signaling different normative 
expectations for the carceral state, including reforming racial and procedural 
justice, increasing prosecutorial accountability for police racism and mass 
incarceration, reforming the basic police mission to deemphasize aggressive 
confrontation through pretextual stops, advancing the causes of human dignity, 
respect, equality, and redemption, and humanizing, destigmatizing, and 
restoring the prosecuted and punished. (Pp. 265–70.) He notes that many of these 
prosecutors are people of color who openly cite the over-policing and 
punishment of communities of color as their motivation for reform and make 
racial justice an explicit value for their offices. (P. 267.) Examples of these new 
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prosecutorial politics of dignity include nomenclature reforms in the Office of 
Justice Programs at the United States Department of Justice during the Obama 
administration and by prosecutors Marilyn Mosby in Baltimore and George 
Gascon in San Francisco. (Pp. 269–70.) Simon concludes, perhaps cynically, 
that the vast majority of prosecutors appear to be banking on the reform 
movement fading away, without political risk to themselves, without any 
significant political or legal limitations on their prosecutorial power or a revision 
of their normative expectations. (P. 271.) 
The collection ends with a chapter by Sklansky, entitled “Unpacking the 
Relationship Between Prosecutors and Democracy in the United States,” in 
which he describes different conceptions of the prosecutor’s role and issues a 
call to think seriously about the challenges that the growing emphasis on 
prosecutorial power and flexibility poses for accountability, noting, in particular, 
that “racial diversity among prosecutors matters . . . .” (Pp. 286, 294–95.)  He 
notes the longstanding critique of American prosecutors as “overly aggressive 
in pursuing criminal convictions and seeking to impose harsh punishment—
except when law enforcement officials engage in wrongdoing, when prosecutors 
. . . are insufficiently aggressive.” (P. 278.) He observes that the 
overcriminalization critique has gained momentum over the past two decades, 
as public awareness over mass incarceration, wrongful convictions, 
prosecutorial misconduct, and police impunity has risen. (P. 278.) He 
summarizes this sentiment simply: “Politics drives [American] prosecutors to 
excessive zeal (except when fellow law enforcement personnel are accused of 
crimes), and prosecutors drive politics to paranoia and a ‘culture of control.’” 
(P. 278.) He concurs with the critique advanced elsewhere in the collection that 
prosecutorial elections in the United States do not currently serve a meaningful 
accountability function, describing prosecutorial elections as “a distraction, with 
little impact on the choices prosecutors make.” (P. 280–81.) 
Sklansky agrees with Davis’s optimistic take on the way forward, 
advocating a participatory model of democracy and suggesting that “local 
elections could be a valuable mechanism for making criminal justice more 
responsive to community concerns and more reflective of community values” 
(P. 281.) if they came with greater transparency. (Pp. 281, 283–84.) His 
suggestions for bolstering transparency and “harness[ing] the power of 
democratic oversight,” (P. 281.) include imposing restraints on prosecutorial 
discretion through bureaucratic guidelines, supervisory oversight, and 
standardized procedures for review of adverse charging decisions, empowering 
community members through the use of “neighborhood prosecution” models, 
and developing a data-driven ranking system or “report card” for prosecutorial 
performance. (Pp. 281–82, 298.) 
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III. CONCLUSION
The study of prosecutorial discretion and accountability is a sprawling and 
well-canvassed field and a challenging one in which to find fresh, original 
contributions.  There is a wide variation in the way that different countries 
organize and regulate their prosecutors and in the national legal cultures in which 
those prosecutors operate, and the contributors to this collection explore 
democratic values that affect the prosecution function around the democratic 
world.  In doing so, they focus on themes that bear on the role of prosecutors in 
shaping criminal-justice systems at the macro level: discretion, supervision, 
oversight, accountability.  One of the themes of the edited collection is the 
tension between prosecutorial independence and accountability, which has 
already been explored extensively in the literature of criminal-law theory.9 
What the insights in this collection of essays contribute to this discussion is 
in their sometimes explicit and sometimes unspoken links to the tough-on-crime 
electoral politics of American prosecution, a particularly salient topic at this 
moment in time.  None of the book chapters explicitly discusses the fact the 
United States is alone in the developed world in electing most of its prosecutors 
(and mostly in partisan elections in which the incumbent runs unopposed for 
reelection)10—probably because this fact is well known to any student of 
comparative criminal law.  Nonetheless, recognizing the dark side of 
“accountability” efforts, particularly when accountability comes in the form of 
electoral politics or hierarchical prosecutorial decision making, is an important 
first step to unpacking the magnitude and quality of prosecutors’ contributions 
to deeply punitive American carceral state. 
9  See, e.g., Giuseppe di Federico, Prosecutorial Independence and the Democratic 
Requirement of Accountability in Italy, 38 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 373 (1998). 
10  See Lantigua-Williams, supra note 3. 
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